摘要
以2009~2014年已实施股权激励的非国有上市公司为对象实证研究了控股股东动机、股权激励与非国有企业的投资效率。结果表明：监督型控股股东环境中,股权激励的实施可以抑制过度投资和投资不足;侵占型控股股东环境中,股权激励虽能抑制公司的投资不足,但会加剧公司的过度投资。股票期权激励方式提供的风险激励对投资不足的抑制更强,但在终极控股股东掏空环境下对过度投资的加剧也更高。
Focused on the non-state-owned listed companies which have implemented equity incentive from 2009 to 2014, thispaper empirically analyzes the motive of controlling shareholder, executives equity incentive, and the investment efficiency ofnon-state-owned companies. Results find that when the ultimate controlling shareholder propping, the equity incentive can inhibitthe over-investment and under-investment. However, when the ultimate controlling shareholder tunneling,equity incentivecan inhibit the under-investment, but will increase the over-investment. The stock option incentive has greater inhibitoryeffect on under-investment, but will increase the over-investment much more when the ultimate controlling shareholder held thetunneling motivation.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第8期92-96,共5页
Soft Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJC630201)
2016年度上海市软科学研究重点项目(16692106200)
上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2015BGL004)
上海对外经贸大学上海大学生创新活动计划项目
关键词
控股股东侵占
控股股东监督
过度投资
投资不足
股权激励
tunneling of the controlling shareholder
propping of the controlling shareholder
over-investment
under-investment
executives equity incentive
