竞争环境下制造商网络渠道选择演化博弈分析

The Evolutionary Game Analysis for Manufacturers' Network Channel Selection in Competitive Environment

通过将演化博弈应用于竞争环境下制造商网络渠道选择研究,分析品牌竞争、渠道竞争以及顾客网络渠道接受度对制造商利润和网络渠道选择的影响作用。研究表明:竞争环境下制造商网络渠道选择是一个对称博弈,单渠道与双渠道间的利润变化会影响博弈的演化趋势;品牌竞争和渠道竞争越激烈,交叉价格因子越大,双渠道带来的制造商利润增额亦越大;顾客网络渠道接受度对影响作用较为复杂,单方双渠道模式下制造商利润随着传统零售市场份额的增加而增加,双方双渠道模式下则随之而降低;博弈可能出现两种演化情况,当双渠道利润高于单渠道时趋向于双渠道,当对方单渠道的利润下降而对方双渠道的利润上升时存在两种演化稳定策略。

This paper studies the m anufacturers, netw ork channel selection in com petitive environm ent based on the evolutionarygam e. A nd then it analyzes the effects of brand com petition, channel com petition, and custom er acceptance for networkchannel on the m anufacturers, profit and netw ork channel selection. R esult finds that m anufacturers’ netw ork channelselection in com petitive environm ent is a sym m etrical gam e. The profit change betw een single - channel and dual - channelwill affect the gam e’s evolutionary trend. The m ore intense of the brand com petition and channel com petition, the bigger thecross - price facto r, and the greater the increased profit obtained through the dual channel. The effect of custom er acceptancefor netw ork channel on the m anufacturers’ profit is com plex. In unilateral dual channel m o d e,m anufacturers’ profit isincreased with the retail m arket sh a re , w hile decreased w ith it in both sides dual channel m ode. The gam e m ay have two e volutioncases. W hen the profits in dual channel higher than w hich in single ch an n e l, m anufacturers tends to select dualchannel. W hen the profits in dual channel is higher w ith the other’s single c h an n e l, and low er w ith the other’s dual ch an n e l,both single channel and dual channel m ay be the evolutionary stable strategy.