管理层风险特质、董事会治理与科技保险参保意愿

Managerial risk characteristics,board governance and willingness to purchase science and technology insurance

本文综合行为金融、公司治理和公司金融理论构建科技保险参保意愿影响因素的理论模型,并基于浙江省635家高新技术企业的问卷调查数据进行实证检验。结论表明:第一,管理层风险偏好和管理层风险认知对高新技术企业科技保险参保意愿具有显著影响:风险喜好型管理者更倾向于采取风险自担策略,抑制科技保险需求;而较高的风险认知则有助于提升企业购买科技保险的意愿。第二,良好的董事会治理有助于提升企业风险管理,独立董事占比越高,企业购买科技保险的意愿越强。第三,管理层风险认知在董事会独立性与企业参保意愿之间发挥部分中介作用,这意味着董事会治理可以通过影响管理层风险认知,间接作用于企业的风险管理决策。

This paper constructs a theoretical model of the determinants of S＆T insurance through synthesizing corporate finance theory ; behavioral finance theory, and corporate governance theory. Based on a survey data of 635 high - tech enterprises in Zhe- jiang province, the empirical results indicate that： firstly, managerial risk preference and risk perception can directly affect the needs of S＆T insurance. Specifically, risk preference will reduce the need of S＆T insurance, while risk perception will increase it. Secondly, board governance is effective for enterprise risk decision making, the higher the proportion of independent direc- tors, the stronger the willingness to purchase S＆T insurance. Third, risk perception plays as mediator between board independence and willingness to purchase S＆T insurance, which means board governance can indirectly influence insurance willingness through affecting risk perception of top managers.