管理层控制权、企业生命周期与真实盈余管理

Managerial Control Power,Corporate Life Cycle and Real Earnings Management

两权分离导致管理层与股东的利益不一致,信息不对称阻碍了公司实际经营信息的流动,使信息使用者不能有效判断盈余信息的真实可靠性。基于理性经济人假说,管理层具有自利行为动机,管理层薪酬激励大多依赖于经营业绩指标,管理层控制权的增加使其对公司生产活动、销售活动及成本等的控制能力增加。随着外部监管环境和内部控制质量的改善,应计盈余管理的成本较大,被外部发现的概率较高,给管理层带来较大的私有成本。真实盈余管理是企业真实活动操控的盈余管理,这种盈余管理主要通过操控企业的经营活动、成本和酌量性费用等实现操控报告盈余的目的。基于企业生命周期理论,从管理层自利行为视角,实证检验管理层控制权对处于不同生命周期企业真实盈余管理的影响。以2003年至2014年中国沪深上市公司A股数据为样本,使用ROYCHOWDHURY模型计量真实盈余管理,以经营活动、投资活动和筹资活动现金净流量不同符号组合衡量企业生命周期阶段,采用STATA 11.0软件及多元线性回归加以分析,检验管理层控制权对真实盈余管理的影响以及企业生命周期对管理层控制权与真实盈余管理关系发挥的调节作用。研究结果表明,管理层控制权与真实盈余管理之间存在显著的正相关关系,管理层控制权的综合指标与真实盈余管理的综合指标及维度指标均存在显著的正相关关系;企业生命周期对管理层控制权与真实盈余管理的关系发挥显著的调节作用;管理层控制权与真实盈余管理的正相关关系在成长期企业和衰退期企业更强,显著高于成熟期企业管理层控制权与真实盈余管理的正相关关系。研究结果验证了从企业生命周期视角探析管理层控制权与真实盈余管理关系的必要性,丰富了企业生命周期、管理层控制权和真实盈余管理相关实证研究,对于提高投资者保护、降低管理层控制权负面经济后果及完善会计信息质量等具有一定的借鉴意义。

Separation of ownership and control lead to managers′and shareholders′interests inconsistent with each other.While information asymmetry blocks corporates′real operating information flow, information users could not effectively distinguish the facticity and reliability of earnings information.Based on rational-economic man hypothesis, managers have self-interest driven motivation.Managerial compensation incentive largely depends on operating performance, and managerial control power increases its control capability on corporate production, sales and costs.With the improvement of the external environment and the en-hancement of internal control, costs of accrual earnings management have been largely increased, and this type of earnings man-agement would be detected easily and then bring self-costs to managers.However, real earnings management in essence refers to manipulating corporate real activities, such as manipulating corporate operational activities, costs and discretionary expenditures to achieve earnings target. Based on the theory of corporate life cycle and from the perspective of managerial self-interest, this paper empirically investigates the influence of managerial control power on real earnings management in different corporate life cycle.Using the samples of Chi-na A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2014 in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges, this paper adopts ROYCHOWDHU-RY model to measure real earnings management, and adopts symbol combination of net cash flow in operating activities, invest-ment activities and financing activities to measure corporates′life cycle stage.Then this paper uses STATA 11.0 and multiple re-gression method to make our analysis.This paper systematically investigates the relationship between managerial control power and real earnings management, as well as the moderating effects of corporate life cycle on the relationship between managerial control power and real earnings management. Based on empirical results, we find that, first there is a significant positive relationship between managerial control power and re-al earnings management.We also find that dimension indicators of managerial control power and aggregate indicators of real earn-ings management has significant positive relationship.What′s more, the relationship between dimension indicators of managerial control power and that of real earnings management is also positive.There is a significant mediating effect of corporate life cycle on the relationship between managerial control power and real earnings management.Results show that, the positive influence of＆nbsp;managerial control power on real earnings management is much more prominent for samples in growth and recession stage.This paper verifies the necessity of investigating the relationship between managerial control power and real earnings management from the perspective of corporate life cycle.The finding of this research enriches relative empirical researches on corporate life cycle, managerial control power and real earnings management.It also has some significance to enhance investor protection, to reduce negative economic consequences of managerial control power and to improve accounting information quality.