谁动了上市公司的壳?——地方保护主义与上市公司壳交易

Who Moves the Listed Companies' Shell:Local Protectionism and Shell Deals

地方保护对税源流动性的干预会影响资源的有效配置。本文以1998-2012年沪深两市A股市场247起上市"壳公司"交易为样本,以企业所得税、增值税、营业税之和占地区财政收入之比衡量地方保护程度,研究发现:壳公司所在地的地方保护程度越高,壳公司越可能被本地公司收购,壳公司被收购后越有可能保持国有性质,而且,壳公司所在地的地方保护程度越高,壳收购活动现金支付比例越高。地方保护主义与壳交易的这些关系在以企业所得税占地区财政收入的比重、营业税占地区财政收入的比重衡量地方保护主义的情况下仍显著存在。但是,在以增值税占地区财政收入比衡量的地方保护主义下不显著。这说明不同税种激励下,地方保护主义对"壳资源"交易干预存在差异。进一步的研究发现,"壳公司"被异地收购后雇员规模和劳动力成本显著降低,经营业绩显著提高。

Under the tax - sharing system, local protection has aggravated local government ＇ s intervention on local capital resource allocation. Based on 247 ＂shell deals＂ from 1998 to 2012 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A - share market, when local protection is measured by the proportion of the sum of enterprise income tax,value- added tax and business tax in fiscal revenue, the proportion of enterprise income tax or business tax in fiscal revenue, we find that the higher the degree of local protection is, the more likely the shell company is to be bought by local companies and maintain their state - owned property. However, this impact is not pronounced when the local protection is measured by the proportion of added - value tax in fiscal revenue. When ＂shell company＂ is bought by non - local companies, its staff and labor cost reduce significantly and its operating performance becomes better.