纵向型企业集团R&D决策的两阶段信号博弈模型

Two-stage signaling game model on R&D decision-making of vertical industrial groups

为了研究动态环境下企业集团的最优 R& D战略 ,建立了一个基于熊彼特的创造性毁灭过程的纵向型集团两阶段 R& D决策的信号博弈模型 .该模型是一个综合的内生增长模型 ,综合了新增长理论中基于资本和基于思想的两类模型 .经过分析 ,给出了集团成员企业的最优 R& D和资本投资战略 .从模型可以推得 ,上游企业的创新大小越大 ,下游企业的最优创新大小越小 ;第 1阶段的创新大小越大 ,第

In order to study the optimal R&D strategies of industrial groups in dynamic environment, this paper sets up a vertical group model on two stage R&D decision making by employing signaling games, based on Schumpeter's process of creative destruction. The model is a synthesized endogenous growth model that incorporates two category models in the new growth theory that are Capital based models and Idea based models. It gives the optimal R&D and capital investment strategies for the member firms of group. It can follow from the model that the larger is the innovation size of upstream firm, the smaller the optimal innovation size of under stream firm is, and the larger is the innovation size of the stage one, the smaller the optimal innovation size of the stage two is.