碳限额与交易机制下供应商-制造商生产决策研究

Production Decision of the Supplier-manufacturer under the Carbon Cap-and-trade Mechanism

考虑由供应商和制造商构成的两级供应链系统,研究碳限额与交易机制下供应商领导的供应链生产决策问题.在碳限额与交易机制下,运用Stackelberg博弈理论,以供应商为领导者,分别给出在分散决策和集中决策时各自以自身收益最大化为目标的最优生产决策,得出供应商和制造商同时达到生产决策的临界点.通过无碳排放约束和碳限额与交易机制的比较,说明碳限额与交易机制能够在一定范围内起到减少碳排放的作用,并通过算例验证了结论的正确性.

Considering a two-stage supply chain system constituted by the suppliers and manufacturers, this paper studies the supply chain production decision problem dominated by the suppliers under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism. In this situation, under the leadership of the suppliers, Stackelberg game theory is used to give optimal production decisions for maximizing their own profit respectively while making the decentralized decision and centralized decision.A conclusion is made that suppliers and manufactures would reach the critical point of production decisions at the same time. By comparing the non-carbon constraints and the cap-and-trade mechanism,the paper proves that the carbon cap-and-trade mec verl hanism can reduce the carbon emission in a certain range. Finally,a numerical example is given to fy the correctness of the conclusion.