行业竞争是外部治理机制还是外部诱导因素——基于中国上市公司盈余管理的经验证据

Industry Competition Is External Governance Mechanism or External Incentives? Based on Empirical Evidence of Chinese Listed Companies' Earnings Management

文章以2007-2013年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,从行业竞争视角考察了行业竞争激烈程度、公司竞争能力以及产权性质对上市公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现:(1)当行业竞争程度较低时,行业竞争与上市公司盈余管理呈负相关关系,即行业竞争体现出外部治理机制;(2)当行业竞争程度较高时,行业竞争与上市公司盈余管理呈正相关关系,即行业竞争体现出外部诱导作用;(3)在特定的行业内,当公司处于竞争劣势时,随着行业竞争的加剧,公司会进行更多的盈余管理;(4)考虑产权性质的影响,当国有企业处于竞争劣势时,随着行业竞争的加剧,处于竞争劣势的国有企业相对于竞争优势的国有企业会使用较多的应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理,而该差异在非国有企业中却不显著。上述结论可为投资者、政府等监管部门制定对策提供参考依据,有助于实现我国经济转轨的健康有序进行。

In general, studies on the relationship between industry competition and earnings management still cannot reach a consensus. Correspondingly, our research drawing on the data from 2007 to 2013 for companies listed in the Chinese A-type share market, we focus on the impact of the intensity of industry competition on earnings management, incorporating company competitiveness and the nature of ownership as independent variables. Empirical evidence reveals the following. （1） When competition is relatively low, industry competition can significantly restrain the extent of earnings management; that is, industry competition reflects an external governance mechanism. （2） When competition is relatively high, industry competition significantly promotes the extent of earnings management; that is, industry competition reflects external incentives. （3） Within a certain industry, the higher the industry competition is, the more companies manipulate earnings when under a competitive inferior position. （4） Considering the type of ownership, as the intensity of industry competition increases, SOEs at a disadvantage use more accrual- based earnings management and real earnings management strategies, which is insignificant for non-SOEs. （5） In the further study, we found that there may be non-linear relationship between industry competition and earnings management, which may be an important reason for the previous scholars＇ research results is not uniform on the study on the relationship between industry competition and earnings management. This paper extends research on the relationship between industry competition and earnings management and provides a new perspective to understanding the relationship between industry competition and earnings management. The results of this study prove significant for the government, the relevant regulatory authorities, and investors. First, on account of inducing more earnings, the government should play more attention to excessively competitive industries. Inappropriate earnings management reduces the transparency of capital markets and misguides investors, which is not conducive to the healthy development of the capital market. Second, stemming from the characteristics of SOEs such as owner absence and a dominate share, the government should focus on SOEs with competitive disadvantage to prevent executives from using their political connections to manipulate earnings, damaging the profits for investors. Finally, we interpret companies＇ earnings management from a new perspective and offer investors the gist that they need to make their own decisions.