非完全利率市场化下网络借贷的利率定价有效吗--来自“人人贷”的微观借贷证据

Is Interest Rate Pricing of P2P Lending Valid under Not Fully Marketized Interest Rate? Evidence from Renrendai.com

P2P作为传统融资模式的有效补充,对缓解长尾人群的融资约束、实现金融的普惠职能有十分重要的促进作用。不同于国外P rosp e r的利率竞价机制,我国P2P的借款利率是由借款人设定的,在信息不对称和非完全市场化双重因素作用下形成的利率是否有效?本文借助"人人贷"上的借款订单数据,从订单达成的时间、满标参与人数、订单完成度和参与人数比例四个维度检验其有效性。本文发现借款利率并没有起到明显的违约风险信号的作用,投资者首先注重收益而后才会意识到风险,因此借款人往往设定较高的利率以减少订单达成的时间和提高投资者的参与度。进一步本文发现,借贷双方经过多次利率博弈后建立的声誉可以缓解借款人的融资约束。

As an effective supplement to traditional financing mode, P2P lending plays an important role in mitigating financing constraint and promoting financing universality for the long tail crowds. Different from foreign bidding mechanism, the interest rate is set by borrowers in China, is interest rate pricing valid under information asymmetry and not fully marketized interest rate？ In this paper, we employ loan orders from Renrendai.com to test its validity, from four dimensions of achievement time, numbers of participants, degree of completion of early bidding stage and participate in proportion of early bidding stage. The empirical results show the interest rate has an inverted U-Shaped relationship with achievement time and numbers of participants, meanwhile the interest rate and early investor participation reach a U-Shape relationship. Investors prefer high-yield loan orders on the Renrendai.com platform, they firstly focus on earnings, and then are aware of risk, therefore borrowers tend to set higher interest rates to reduce the achievement time of orders and improve early investor participation. Above all, the interest rate does not play significant signals of default risk, thus it is invalid. Further found, the constraint mechanism of P2P lending platform is very valid, repeated lending mode can effectively reduce moral hazard problems for borrowers. Good reputation, which was established by multiple games between borrowers and lenders, indeed eases the financing constraints for borrowers, so that the borrowers have the incentive to maintain their reputation. This article believes that, the P2P lending platform should intensify strength and breadth of the investor education, makes the investors more intelligent, rational and risk identification ability. This would promote marketoriented interest rate reform in China, make resources allocation more effective. This paper also believe that, regulators should guide the interest rate return to a rational level, which would prevent the formation of ＂lemon market＂, to reduce fragileness and bankruptcy risk of the P2P lending platform.