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基于生命周期理论的股权激励实施倾向及效果分析 被引量:11

Empirical Analysis on the Implementation and Effect of Equity Incentive Plan Based on Enterprise Life Cycle Theory
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摘要 本文以2006~2013年上市公司的数据,采用倾向系数得分方法,共获得2206家配对样本,通过企业生命周期划分指标,从企业发展进程的动态层面考察我国上市公司股权激励实施的动机、股权激励方式、实施强度以及实施效果。研究发现,发展较为成熟的上市公司,实施股权激励计划的可能性更高;企业生命周期的不同阶段不会影响股权激励计划的激励方式;此外,进一步的研究还发现,较为成熟的上市公司,其股权激励的强度也会较高,股权激励实施的效果会更好。 Using Propensity Score Matching method, the paper received 2206 paired samples from the listed companies which published the stock incentive plan during 2006 and 2013. The paper empirically analyses the motivation, mode, intensity and effect of equity incentive plan of listed company from the dynamic aspect of the company development process. The study found that the well-developed listed company has higher possibility of the implementation of equity incentive plan. Stages of enterprise life cycle do not affect the mode of equity incentive plans. In addition, further research finds that the equity incentive intensity and its effect will be better in more mature listed companies.
作者 巩娜
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第8期13-21,共9页 Securities Market Herald
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71172017 71502108) 曙光计划项目(10SG54) 上海市教委重点学科项目(J51701 13KJYJ03)
关键词 生命周期 股权激励计划 LOGIT模型 TOBIT模型 enterprise life cycle, equity incentive plan, logit model, tobit model
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