资源枯竭型矿区土地置换行为动态演化分析

Dynamic Evolution Analysis about Land Exchange Behavior of Resource-exhausted Mining Region

明晰资源枯竭型矿区土地置换主体的行为诉求方式,是指导矿区土地功能性退出和高效利用的关键问题。将矿业企业与政府之间的土地置换行为作为研究客体,运用演化博弈理论构建了政企博弈两阶段复制动态模型。模型求解表明:1双方均对高收益策略具有模仿倾向,但利益均衡是两者土地置换行为发生的前提条件和必然要求;2有限理性的博弈主体在矿区土地置换过程中总是根据既得利益不断学习和动态调整自己的策略,从而使所得利益得到改善;3监督成本、额外收益和惩罚成本是影响博弈主体演化稳定的关键因素,它们之间的相互制衡对实现政企土地置换的稳定状态具有重要作用。研究结果科学地揭示了资源枯竭矿区土地置换瓶颈的成因,为政府制定资源型城市转型土地利用政策提供科学依据。

In the resource- exhausted mining region land exchange, distincting land exchange subject＇s action appeal mode was the core issue of guiding mining land functionally exit and efficient use. This paper set up a two - phase replicated dynamic model based on evolutionary game theory regarding land exchange behavior between mining enterprise and government as research object. Model solving showed that：Firstly, both sides had a tendency to imitate the high- yield strategies, but the balance of interests was prerequisites and inevitable requirements of land exchange behavior happening. Secondly, in order to improve the resulting benefit, game subject bounded rationality always learning and dynamically adjust the strategy constantly based on vested interests. Thirdly, monitoring costs, additional benefits and penalty costs were key factors of affecting game subject＇s evolu- tionary stable, mutual checks and balances among these factors played a crucial role in steady state of land exchange between mining enterprise and government. The above research results could provide scientific basis for the government to formulate the land use policy of resources cities transforma- tion which scientifically revealed reasons of resource - exhausted mining region land exchange bottleneck.