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股权集中情况下跨国公司参与者的行为策略分析

Strategic Analysis of Multinational Corporation Participant Behavior under Equity Concentration
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摘要 针对股权集中型跨国公司参与者的行为策略问题,先是建立了不同股东间的博弈模型,对控股股东与小股东之间纯战略的治理博弈进行分析,得出了博弈的均衡解:小股东实施外部治理而控股股东实施内部治理;同时利用已有模型,完成了代理人做出道德风险行为时被发现并被处罚的概率、做出道德风险行为所能带来的额外收益、在职期限的长短、未来收益的贴现率、做出道德风险行为被发现后所能得到的工资等多种因素对股权集中型跨国公司代理人的道德风险程度影响的研究。 In view of the issue of behavior strategy on the part of equity concentrated multinational corporation participants, this study firstly establishes game models between stockholders, then analyzes the purely strategic regulation game between controlling shareholders and small shareholders to obtain the equilibrium solution: small shareholders conduct the external regulation and controlling shareholders conduct the internal regulation; based on the existing model, various factors influencing the extent of moral hazard of transnational agency are studied, including: probability of agent moral hazard being found and punished, amount of extra returns brought by moral hazard, agency period, discount rate of future returns and amount of pay after moral hazard be found.
出处 《洛阳师范学院学报》 2016年第4期76-78,82,共4页 Journal of Luoyang Normal University
关键词 跨国代理 股权集中 控股股东 小股东 跨国代理人 transnational agency ownership concentration controlling shareholder small shareholder transnational agent
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