新型城镇化进程中地方政府环境治理行为研究

Study on the environmental governance behavior of local government in the process of new urbanization

环境污染已经成为困扰中国城市可持续发展和新型城镇化建设的重要问题。在新型城镇化的进程中,地方政府的治理策略面临着从以经济增长为中心向经济增长与环境治理并重的转型困境。在这一转型背景下,本文认为,地方政府的环境治理行为主要包含三个方面的内容:地方政府自身的环境治理行为、地方政府与地方政府之间的协作治理行为、地方政府与民众的环境协作治理行为。每一种地方政府环境治理行为都会受到不同因素的激励或制约。本文通过对官员晋升锦标赛、短任期制与官吏分途的分析,环境治理合作的群集型网络和松散型网络的探讨,以及对邻避抗争与公民参与的分析,提出地方政府自身环境治理行为的选择受到地方官员的晋升锦标赛、短任期制与官吏分途的影响;地方政府间的环境协作治理行为受到彼此权衡合作风险与收益结果的制约;地方政府与民众的环境协作治理行为受到地方政府与民众环境风险信息沟通情况和协商缓解机制建立与否等因素的影响。基于此,本文提出需要在构建与地方官员治理动机相兼容的激励机制、地方政府间高度集群型协作契约的签订与执行,以及民众对地方环保政策的参与机制和邻避冲突的缓解机制等方面进行改革,从而更有效地推进地方政府的环境治理。

Environmental pollution is rising as a serious problem for the urban sustainable development and new urbanization in current China. In the process of new urbanization, the local government is faced with the dilemma of strategic transformation, that is, from economic growth to environmental governance. Under such context, this article argues that the environmental governance behavior of local government includes three aspects： the environmental governance behavior by the local government, the collaborative environmental governance behavior among local governments, and the environmental governance behavior between the public and local government. Each environmental governance behavior of local government is motivated or restricted by some factors. Through the analysis of political tournament, short tour of duty and the division of official and clerk, the Interdependent-Risk-Spreading Network and Independent-Risk-Spreading Network of environmental collaborative governance, and the NIMBY protest and public participation, this article puts forward that the choice of environmental governance behavior for local government is influenced by political tournament, short tour of duty and the division of official and clerk. The collaborative environmental governance behavior among local governments is restricted by the risk calculation of cooperation. The environmental governance behavior between the public and local government is influenced by their communication about the environmental risk information and the construction of negotiation and solution mechanisms. Based on these arguments, this article argues that the stimulation mechanism compatible with local officials＇ motivation, the implementation of the clustered collaborative contracts among local governments, and the local public participation in environmental policies and the solution mechanism for NIMBY protest should be strengthened so as to push the environmental governance of local governments effectively.