中国省级政府间社会保障财政支出的空间竞争——基于2004—2013年省级面板数据

The Space Competition between the Social Security Expenditure of the Provincial Governments in China:Based on the Provincial Panel Data from 2004 to 2013

中国正处在由追求简单经济增长向追求社会民生转变的阶段,而社会保障作为具有代表性的公共服务项目,是保障社会民生的重要组成部分。本文基于2004—2013年省级的面板数据,构建空间滞后模型(SAR)和空间误差模型(SEM),实证分析地方政府可能存在的社会保障财政支出相互竞争行为。结果表明:地方政府间社会保障财政支出存在显著的标尺竞争,即对于省级地方政府而言,当国内其他竞争对手增加社会保障财政支出时,该省级政府官员出于政绩的考核,也会增加社会保障财政支出,从而导致了我国不同省份省级地方政府社会保障财政支出具有显著的正相关性。此外,研究还发现了财政分权与省级地方政府的社会保障财政支出呈显著的负相关性,财政分权挤出了省级地方政府的社会保障财政支出。

This paper based on 2004 ～2013 provincial panel data,finds that there is a significant yardstick competition in the local government fiscal expenditure and that for local governments at the provincial level. When the other domestic competitors increase fiscal expenditure on social security,for the sake of performance,the local government will also increase social security fiscal expenditure,resulting that China＇s different provincial local government social security expenditure has a significant positive correlation. In addition,the study also finds a significant negative correlation between fiscal decentralization and social security expenditure of provincial local government,the financial decentralization of the provincial local government＇s social security expenditure.