摘要
最近,普里查德提出了一种非常有说服力的知识理论,即反运气德性知识论。该理论主张知识必须具备两个基本条件,即能力条件和反运气条件:前者指知识必须是认知能力的产物,后者指知识必须排除掉认知运气。普里查德认为这种理论更符合直觉地解释知识的本质和结构,而且还能够更好地解决知识的价值问题。然而,这个理论存在严重的问题,它夸大了运气在知识论中的作用,并且错误地使用了克雷格的概念谱系学。
Recently, Duncan Pritchard presents a very convincing theory of knowledge, called ＂anti-luck virtue epistemology＂（viz. ALVE）. This theory holds that knowledge must have two basic conditions, namely ability condition and anti-luck condition. The former means knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability, while the latter means knowledge must rule out epistemic luck. Pritchard argues that this theory is superior to other kinds of virtue epistemology, because it not only can provide more intuitive explanation of the nature and structure of knowledge, but also can better address the value problem of knowledge, especially the tertiary value problem. However, it has several serious problems： it exaggerated the role of luck in the theory of knowledge, and wrongly used Craig＇s concept genealogy.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期40-46,共7页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"当代知识论的系列研究"子课题"认知价值研究"(项目编号:14ZDB012)
浙江省之江青年课题成果
关键词
反运气德性知识论
能力条件
反运气条件
价值问题
普里查德
Anti-luck virtue epistemology
Ability condition
Anti-luck condition
Value problem
Duncan Pritchard
