我国公共住房建设融资模式创新路径选择——一个博弈模型分析

Research on the Route Choice of the Public Housing Construction Financing——a research of game model

基于信息不对称框架下一个博弈模型,探讨我国公共住房建设融资模式创新路径的选择。主要结论是,在单重博弈中,当金融机构判断城市财政负担低的概率较低时,没有足够抵押品的公共住房融资平台将很难获得足额的贷款;在多重博弈中,如果金融机构预期市场不景气,将降低对融资平台金融支持,融资平台将转变自己的行为从而提高资信等级;如果金融机构预期融资平台属于不良贷款行为的类型,将降低对融资平台的信贷支持。政策含义是,我们需要改变公共住房建设资金出资方,借鉴住房建设中采用的反抵押贷款模式,以此作为产权导向型创新路径的主要贷款模式。

Based on an asymmetry information game model, this paper analyzes the route choice of the public housing construction financing. This study mainly concludes： in a single-stage game when the bank expects a low probability of low government financial burden, public housing financing platform without sufficient mortgage will be difficult to obtain sufficient loan; in a multi-stage game, if the bank expects a stagnant market, the bank will reduce the financial support for the borrower, and then the borrower will change their behavior so as to improve the credit rating; if the bank expects borrowers with non-performing loan behavior, the bank will reduce the credit support for the borrower. The policy implication of this paper is that we need to change the public housing construction funds investors, and borrow the reverse mortgage model in housing construction as the main innovative property oriented loan model.