碳排放权初始分配中防范企业逆向选择的演化博弈

Evolutionary Game Analysis to Prevent Enterprise Adverse Selection in the Initial Allocation of Carbon Emission Rights

在碳排放权初始配额的免费分配过程中,企业逆向选择会导致政府配额分配过量进而影响减排效果和环境治理,针对这一问题,以"复制动态方程"和"演化稳定策略"为建模基础,构建政府和企业间的演化博弈模型来研究博弈双方和系统的演化稳定策略,并通过仿真模拟分析相关参数对演化路径的影响。结果显示:当政府对谎报企业的罚金小于其监管成本时,博弈存在演化稳定策略,即企业谎报碳排放量且政府不监管。为避免出现这种企业逆向选择却不受监管的不利局面,政府应积极运用各种手段降低监管成本,加大对谎报企业的惩处力度,同时加强与企业的沟通,从而实现碳排放权初始配额的合理分配。

The overdose allocation of government carbon emission rights quota caused by enterprise adverse selection in the free allocation of carbon emission rights initial quota has negatively affected the reduction effect and environmental governance. For this question, this paper builds an evolutionary game model between the governments and the enterprises based on the ＂Replicator Dynamics Equation＂ and the ＂Evolutionary Stable Strategy＂ to study the evolutionary stable strategy of the game and the system, and to analyze the influence of related parameters on the evolution path through the simulation. The results show that when the fine that the government gets from a lying enterprise is less than its regulatory cost, the evolutionary game has a evolutionary stable strategy in which the enterprise lies to the government about carbon emissions and the government doesn＇t supervise the enterprise. To avoid such unfavorable situation in which adverse selection is unregulated, the government should actively use various means to reduce regulatory costs and increase the intensity of punishment for enterprises that lie about carbon emissions, while strengthening communication with enterprises, so as to realize the reasonable distribution of the carbon emission rights initial quota.