摘要
西南地方势力与蒋介石围绕"剿共"问题的较量,反映了抗战前国民党地方实力派与中央关系调适过程中的艰难与曲折。横亘于二者控制范围之间的江西中共苏区,客观上成为西南地方势力维持半独立状态的地缘屏障。蒋介石、陈济棠、胡汉民表面上均表示合作"剿共",实际上相互算计,各自排演自己的好戏。1934年9、10月间,中央红军向西突围后,西南地方势力在失去了战略缓冲空间的被动局面下,一方面试图利用胡汉民在政治上的号召力"迫蒋入川",缓解正面、直接的军事压力,同时军事上积极部署出兵夺黔。蒋则借入黔"剿共"之机,成功改造贵州政局,从战略上完成了对两广的三面包围。蒋在战略上获胜的同时,却增加了两广实力派与其心理上的隔阂,最终导致双方走向武力解决。
The contests between the local forces in Southwest China and Chiang Kai-shek reflected the twists and turns in the process of adjustment between the KMT local forces and the KMT central government prior to the Anti-Japanese War. The Jiangxi Central Soviet base area lying between the above mentioned two forces actually served as a kind of geographic shield for the local forces in SW China to maintain their semi-dependence. Chiang kai-shek, Chen Jitang and Hu Hanmin all agreed to cooperate in "suppressing the Communists", but were in fact contending with each other and each was acting his own way. In September and October of 1834, the Central Red Army went westward and broke through, and the southwest forces lost the strategic buffer space. They tried to force Chiang to enter Sichuan so as to relieve their direct military pressure, and at the same time, attempted to seize Guizhou. And Chiang, taking advantage of this chance, succeeded in reshaping the political map of Guizhou, and thus fulfilled his strategic encirclement of Guangdong and Guangxi. But this set up a barrier between Chiang and the forces in those two provinces, leading to the settlement of the issues by use of force.
出处
《军事历史研究》
2016年第4期15-28,共14页
Military History Research
关键词
长征
“剿共”
蒋介石
陈济棠
胡汉民
the Long March
"Encirclement of the Communists"
Chiang Kai-shek
Chen Jitang
Hu Hanmin