摘要
过度的金融创新与日益复杂金融交易,导致了2008年金融危机的爆发。然而,危机之后的一系列金融监管改革,却并未对金融创新的制度缺陷作出有效应对。本文基于对担保融资、资产证券化和金融衍生品法律制度的法经济学分析,研究金融创新发展与其基础法律制度变迁之间的动态关系,深入地揭示了金融危机爆发的制度根源,即隐性担保与错误的破产法立法政策所导致的"立法失灵"。因此,一味强调公共监管改革并非彻底消除金融风险的治本之策。解决隐性担保,应当在立法上确立"实质大于形式原则"的基本原则,并强化担保公示,降低担保融资的破产法律成本,缩小金融创新特殊规则的适用范围,消除金融特权。民法典编纂中相关法律制度的设计应当从控制系统性风险的角度出发,为金融创新的发展奠定坚实制度基础。
The excessive financial innovation and the increasing complicated financial transactions had led to the burst of the 2008 global financial crisis. However, the post--crisis financial regulation did not make a correct response to the fundamen- tal drawbacks of financial innovation in the governing laws.Based on an interdisciplinary research on the law on secured transac- tion, securitization and financial derivative contracts from the point of view of law and economics,the current research try the explore the dynamic interplay between financial innovation and the insitutional changes in its governing laws, and thus reveal the fundamental origin of the 2008 financial crisis, namely the the secret lien and the "legislation failure" represented by the wrong- ful hankrtupcy legislative policy. In order to confront the secret lien, it is necessary to adopt the principle of "Substance domi- nates over form", strenthen the perfection of security interests, lower the bankcrupt costs of secured lending and narrow the application of the "safe harbor" rules, in order to the eliminate the misused financial priviliges. For China, it is necessary to make the Civil Code from the point of view of the systemic risk control, so as to lay down the robust foundation for the develp- ment of financial innovation in China.
出处
《法学评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期50-62,共13页
Law Review