风险规避视角下PPP项目中的政府作为研究——基于委托代理理论

Research on Governmental Action in the PPP Projects in Risk Aversion:Based on Principal-agent Model

从政府"政策风险"和企业行为"道德风险"规避的角度出发,基于委托代理理论,构建风险规避模型。通过各方收益最大化时政府激励行为的分析,揭示将企业的收益直接与项目总收益挂钩是政府较优的激励措施;提出树立信用型政府形象可以提升企业参与项目积极性的观点;论证完善监督机制是减小企业行为的道德风险,增加项目总效应的具体方法。

Based on the principal-agent theory, the paper constructs the risk aversion model from policy risk of the government and the ethical risk of enterprises behavior. Through the analysls ot government lncentive behavior of the maximum profit of all parties, reveals that directly linking enterprise income with the total project revenue is a better incentive measure for the goverment. And, proposes the viewpoint that establishing a credit type government image can enhance the enthusiasm of enterprises participating in the project, demonstrates that optimizing the supervision mechanism is the concrete method to reduce the moral hazard of enterprise behavior and increase the total effect of the project.