认知闭合原则在经验知识中的地位——从怀疑论的闭合论证谈起

The Role of the Epistemic Closure Principle in Empirical Knowledge——Starting from the Closure Argument of Skepticism

基于闭合原则之上的闭合论证被认为是怀疑论论证的一种基本形式。因此,反驳闭合论证(原则)被认为是反驳怀疑论的重要策略。但这种对闭合论证的看法不合理。因为闭合论证不是怀疑论论证的本质形式。当然,这并不说明闭合原则在经验知识中的应用没有问题。在经验知识中既不能无条件的应用闭合原则,也不能一概反对它。将闭合原则视为经验知识的无条件的原则不符合事实;一概抛弃它会损害经验知识的系统化。精确定位闭合原则在经验知识中的地位是解决问题的办法。闭合原则不是经验知识的建构原则,因此它不能在经验知识中起建构作用;但它是经验知识的范导原则,具有提示经验知识趋向统一、使知识系统化的作用。

The epistemic closure argument based on the epistemic closure principle is considered to be a basic form of skeptical argument. Therefore, refuting the argument （then the principle） is considered to be an important strategy to refute skepticism. But this view for the closure argument is unreasonabla. Because the closure argument is not the intrinsieal form of skeptical argument. But, this does not mean that there is no problem in the application of the principle Io empirical knowledge. In the field of empirical knowledge the application of the principle neither is unconditional, nor totally false. Regarding the closure principle as the unconditional principle of empirical knowledge does not fit the facts, and totally excluding the principle will damage the systematization of empirical knowledge. The key to solve the problem is to position precisely the role of the principle in empirical knowledge. The prin- ciple is not constitutional principle of empirical knowledge, so it cannot play a role in the construction of empirical knowledge. But the principle is regulative principle that guides empirical knowledge to unify and systematization.