炫耀性消费品的动态定价

Dynamic pricing of conspicuous goods

结合经济学研究领域的强弱市场理论,以销售期内的炫耀性消费品为研究对象,研究强弱市场和消费者炫耀性消费对销售商最优定价策略以及期望收益的影响.建立了两阶段销售期内的最优价格模型,通过对模型的理论和算例分析发现:具有无限产能的条件下,在强市场中销售商为获得更多的炫耀者,会选择在第一阶段定高价,在第二阶段降低价格;而在弱市场中,两阶段定价均不能太高.此外,强市场对销售商期望收益有着正面的影响,而弱市场则对销售商的期望收益有负面影响.

This paper studies the pricing strategy of luxury goods in a strong market and a weak market with the revenue management theory. Optimal pricing models are first established in a two-stage sales period. Based on theoretical and numerical analysis of the models, with unlimited production capacity, the vendors choose to set a higher price in the first phase and a lower price in the second phase in a strong market. A strong market has a positive impact on the expected revenue of the sellers. However, a weak market is quite different. It has a negative effect on the expected revenue of the sellers gains, the vendors cannot have a too high price tag in a weak market .