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法制环境、两权分离与资本结构动态调整 被引量:5

Legal Environment,the Separation of Ownership and Control Right and the Dynamic Adjustment of Capital Structure
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摘要 本文实证检验了法制环境以及控股股东控制权和所有权分离对资本结构动态调整的影响。研究发现:上市公司控股股东控制权和所有权分离程度越高,实际资本结构偏离最优资本结构的幅度越大,资本结构调整速度越慢;上市公司所处的法制环境越好,实际资本结构偏离最优资本结构的幅度越小,资本结构调整速度越快;法制环境的改善能够显著的缓解两权分离对资本结构动态调整的负面影响;结合中国的制度背景,基于公司产权性质的分析发现,相比国有上市公司,非国有上市公司受法制环境和两权分离的影响更加显著。 Based on the data of China’s A share listed firm s, this paper studies the effect imposed by the separation ofcontrol right and ownership and legal environment on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure. The results are as follows :the lower the level of separation of control right and ownership, the slower the speed of dynamic adjustment of capital structureand the higher the level of capital structure deviation; the better the legal environment, the faster the speed of dynamic adjustmentof capital structure and the lower the level of capital structure deviation ; the improvement of the legal environment cansignificantly alleviate the negative effect imposed by the separation of control right and ownership on the dynamic adjustment ofcapital structure. Finally, based on China’s institution background, the research finds that compared with state-owned firms,non-state-owned firms are more significantly affected by the separation of control right and ownership and legal environment .
作者 邹萍 厉国威
出处 《财经论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第9期63-71,共9页 Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金(2662015PY231 2662015QD0147)
关键词 法制环境 两权分离 资本结构动态调整 资本结构偏离度 legal environment separation of ownership and control right dynamic adjustment of capital structure capitalstructure deviation
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