中国商业车险奖惩系统的精算分析

Actuarial Analysis of Bonus-Malus System in Chinese Commercial Motor Vehicle Insurance

2015年我国商业车险费率市场化改革试点实施后,媒体对新车险的奖惩系统进行了大肆渲染,一方面强调大多数投保人的应缴保费将会下降,另一方面也指出出险次数多的高风险投保人将会受到"严惩"。从平均保费水平、惩罚严厉性指数、风险区分度和弹性等四个方面对2015版的车险奖惩系统进行了精算度量,并将其与2007版的奖惩系统进行了对比分析,一方面从精算学的角度对媒体的宣传报道进行了实证检验,另一方面指出了2015版奖惩系统增加了风险区分度、提高了效率,同时也加重了对高级别保单持有人的过度惩罚。

After the emergence of the reform pilot of Chinese motor vehicle rate marketing in 2015, themedia has given special attention to the new bonus-malus system. They emphasized that the premiumthat the policyholder should pay will decrease for most drivers, meanwhile the high risky insureds whoclaim frequently will be punished severely. In this paper, the （2015） bonus-malus system is examinedwith criteria of expected premium, severe punishment index, the degree of risk classification andelasticity from actuarial perspective, compared with the （2007） bonus- malus system as well. On onehand, this article did an empirical evaluation of the media remark, on the other hand, it has pointed outthe enhancement of the elasticity and the degree of risk classification of the （2015） bonus- malussystem, however the over-penalizing on the policyholders who occupy the higher levels is strengthened.