预期收益参考下的供应链保险契约研究

Supply chain research of the insurance contract under the reference of expected earning

针对由损失规避零售商和风险中性供应商组成的两级供应链的订货决策和协调问题,引入新的决策参考点来探究损失规避行为,并在此基础上构建了考虑损失规避的效用函数,研究了零售商在损失规避下对供应链最优决策和供应链协调性的影响.研究表明:零售商的最优订货量随着供应商批发价格的增加而减少;零售商的最优订货量随其损失规避系数的增加而减少;在批发价格契约下,供应链不能达到系统最优,但是引进保险契约可以使供应链双方达到Pareto最优.算例表明文中分析及结论具有较好的参考价值.

In this paper,we study the order decision and coordination problems of a two-stage supply chain,the retailer being lose averse and supplier risk neutral. This paper introduces a new decision-making reference point to explore fair neutral behavior and builds the utility function on the basis of the new decision points which considers lose averse. Then,we study the retailer＇s effects on the optimal decision of supply chain and supply chain coordination. The research shows that the retailer＇s optimal order quantity increases with the increase of suppliers wholesale price reduction,the retailer＇s optimal order quantity reduces with the increase of the coefficient of lose averse,under wholesale price contract,the supply chain cannot achieve optimal system,but both sides of the supply chain can achieve Pareto optimality by introducing the insurance contract. The final conclusion is verified by an example.