风电入网合同机制研究

Forecast-commitment contract of wind power integration

基于存在电量现货交易市场的假设,针对风电场和电网公司所组成的系统,研究了风电入网合同机制.为有效管理风电场所供给电能的供应波动性,分别提出两种风电入网合同机制:固定供给合同和预测承诺供给合同.相对于前者,预测承诺供给合同将部分供应波动风险从风电场转移给电网公司,并且降低了电网公司对电量现货交易市场的依赖程度.研究了风电场和电网公司的最优决策,以及系统参数对系统均衡的影响.最后,分析了政府的补贴策略对成员决策的影响,得出从社会总福利最大化的视角,政府补贴全部提供给风电场为占优策略,且该补贴策略使得社会总福利得到帕累托改进;但从系统运作指标的角度分析,补贴给风电场虽然减少了弃风率,却增加了系统对电量现货交易市场的依赖性.

Assuming that there exists an electricity spot market,the contract between one wind power plant and one power grid company is studied. To effectively manage the fluctuation of the wind power supply,both the fixed supply contract and the forecast-commitment supply contract,where the latter transfers part of the supply fluctuation risk from the wind power plant to the power grid company,are studied; this reduces the dependence of the wind power plant on the electricity spot market. The optimal decisions of the wind power plant and the power grid company,as well as the sensitivity of the optimal decisions and profits to the spot market price and the risk attitudes are discussed. Finally,how the government subsidy policy affects the members' decisions is analyzed and the conclusion is that to provide the subsidy to the wind power plant is always better and a Pareto improvment from the perspective of social welfare maximization. Providing the subsidy to the wind power plant can reduce the rate of the abandoning wind,and increase the dependence of the wind power plant on the electricity spot market.