控制类型差异、企业投资行为与企业绩效——中国上市家族企业的经验分析与实证检验

The Difference of Control Type,Enterprises' Investment and Firm Performance:An Empirical Analysis and Test of Listed Family Firms of China

根据公司实际控制人取得控制权途径的不同,参考企业两权分离程度的现实差异,可将企业控制类型分为企业家控制类型与资本家控制类型。文献研究表明,控制类型与企业绩效并非简单相关,其中可能包含一些变量的中介传导作用。因此,本文基于企业家理论与委托代理理论,以企业投资行为作为中介变量,选取了在沪深A股上市的177家家族企业2010—2014年的面板数据为样本,对控制类型、企业投资行为与企业绩效三者之间的相互关系进行了实证研究。研究发现,企业家控制较资本家控制在当前经理人市场尚未完善的环境下更为有效,同时揭示了控制类型通过企业投资行为中介作用于企业绩效的机理。此外,由控制类型差异引发的非效率投资显著阻碍了企业绩效的提升,并且投资不足比过度投资对企业绩效的提升阻碍作用更强。

According to the different control ways of ultimate controller and the separation be- tween ownership and control, enterprises control type can be divided into entrepreneurs control type and capitalists control type. Literature studies have shown that the type of control is not simply related to firm performance, which may contain some variables mediation conduction. Therefore, 177 listed family firms＇ panel data from year 2010 to 2014 in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share are se- lected as samples, with investment behavior as mediating variables, and the correlation between control type, investment behavior and firm performance are empirically investigated. The study found that entrepreneurs control type is more effective than capitalist control type in the current manager market, and revealed investment behavior plays a mediating role between control type and firm performance. In addition, inefficient investment caused by control type significantly hindered the firm performance, and under--investment have a stronger impediment to firm performance.