区间合作对策核心非空的几个充分条件

Sufficient Conditions for the Non-emptiness of the Interval Core

核心是合作对策中广泛使用的一个集值解概念。本文在合作对策的收益值为区间数的情形下,对其核心进行详细探讨,从不同角度证明得到了区间合作对策具有非空核心的几个充分条件,这些结论都是经典合作对策中相应结果的推广。利用这些充分条件有助于更好地判断何种区间合作对策具有非空核心,从而使合作具有较强的稳定性。

The core is a widely used set-valued solution concept in cooperative game theory. The interval core is discussed in detail for cooperative interval game. Several sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the interval core are given from different perspectives. These conclusions are generalizations of the corresponding results in classical cooperative game theory. These sufficient conditions will help to judge what cooperative interval games have nonempty cores, so that this cooperation has a good stability.