摘要
双渠道供应链由一个零售商和开辟网络直销渠道的制造商构成。在需求信息不对称的条件下,考虑网络直销渠道的市场份额和渠道替代系数的影响,构建了零售商和制造商之间的信号博弈模型。分析发现零售商会根据批发价格的大小决定是否扭曲订货量,即向制造商传递错误的市场需求信息。而制造商的批发价格决策与其直销渠道销售成本相关。此外,利用算例分析了网络直销渠道市场份额和渠道替代系数对双渠道供应链的影响。
Dual-channel supply chain is made up of a retailer and a manufacturer who opens a direct sale channel. Given the asymmetric information of demand, considering the market share of direct channel and channel substitute coefficient, we build a signaling game model between retailer and manufacturer. We find that the retailer decides whether to distort the order quantity according to the wholesale price, and thus to mislead the manufacturer to believe that the market demand is small. The manufacturer＇ s wholesale price decision is related to its operational cost of direct channel. In addition of direct channel and channel substitute coefficient , with numerical examples, the influence of the market share is analyzed and discussed.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第4期125-133,共9页
Operations Research and Management Science
