基于Rahman模型排污权分配的控制路径研究

Research on The Control Path of Emission Rights Allocation Based on Rahman Modle

在专业污水处理企业参与排污权交易条件下,基于拉赫曼(Rahman)模型[1],研究了生产排污系统1和污水治理系统2的排污权分配控制路径问题,以最大化未来某个给定时间的社会福利。结果表明:当系统1在"绿色生产率"上具有相对优势时,尽管在环境储蓄倾向上不高于系统2,但政府仍会把所有排污权分配给系统1;当系统1在"排污权生产率"上处于相对劣势时,只要其环境储蓄倾向相对较高,且在"绿色生产率"上具有相对优势,则排污权的分配策略存在跳跃点,如政府初始决策时间在跳跃点之前发生,那么在到达跳跃点之前,系统1仍可得到全部排污权。越过跳跃点,政府不再给系统1分配排污权;当系统1的环境储蓄倾向、排污权生产率,以及"绿色生产率"均具有相对优势时,政府会把排污权都分配给系统1。研究结果为污水处理产业化提供了理论依据和实践上的指导建议。

The main purpose of this study was to control the allocation of emission rights, in order to obtain the maximum social welfare in a given future time. Considered two systems ： one of them was the system 1 composed of production enterprises and the other one was the system 2 composed of professional sewage treatment enterprises. Allowed licensed sewage treatment enterprises to be involved in emissions trading. The studies we have performed showed that：If the system 1 has a comparative advantage ＂green productivity＂ and it＇s environment to save propensity not higher than the system 2, it will obtain all of the emission rights ; If the system 1 has a disadvantage in the emission of productivity , as long as the environment propensity to save is relatively high as well as comparative advantage in ＂green productivity＂, it will exist the jump point about the control strategy of the government allocation of emission rights . If the initial time of government decision making comes before the jump point , the system 1 can get all right allocation from government. , but when the time goes cross the jump point over, the government will no longer give system 1 any permits distribution ; If the system 1 has relative advantage in environment tendency, emission productivity, as well as ＂green productivity＂ , the government would put all emissions allocated to system 1. The results provide guidance theory and practice for the sewage treatment industry.