考虑支付意愿条件下服务成本对B2B电子中介定价策略的影响研究

The Impact of Cost to Serve on Price Strategy for B2B E-intermediary Considering Willingness to Pay

对于B2B电子中介而言,除了考虑卖方企业使用B2B平台的支付意愿以外,如何进一步结合其服务卖方企业过程中成本支出的高低进行会员费的差异化定价,已成为管理实践中影响B2B电子中介获利能力的重要问题。针对上述问题,通过综合考虑支付意愿、服务成本等因素,构建了一个两阶段的、寡头垄断的B2B电子中介定价决策模型,探讨了考虑支付意愿这一条件下服务成本对B2B电子中介定价决策的影响。研究结果表明,当卖方企业之间服务成本高低差异较小时,B2B电子中介可忽视服务成本,主要基于支付意愿对卖方企业进行差异化定价,但这一差异化定价带来的利润却低于不基于任何因素的非差异化定价时的利润。当卖方企业之间服务成本高低差异较大时,B2B电子中介对于高服务成本的卖方企业主要基于其服务成本进行高定价,从而有选择性的流失部分服务成本较高的卖方企业;对于低服务成本的卖方企业主要基于其支付意愿进行低定价以保留这些服务成本较低的卖方企业,当服务成本高低差异足够高时,这一差异化定价带来的利润会较高。研究结果对于B2B电子中介如何通过差异化定价进行卖方企业的保留与获取以提高利润提供有益的指导。

How to price discriminate using seller＇ s willingness to pay and cost to serve a seller has become the major issue preventing B2B e-intermediaries to improve their capability in profitability. Therefore, the paper develops a two-period monopoly model with heterogeneity in willingness to pay and differential cost to serve, and focuses on discussing the impact of cost to serve on price strategy in the presence of willingness to pay. The results show that, when heterogeneity in cost to serve between the high and low cost sellers is small, even with cost information, B2B e-intermediary discriminates and offers different equilibrium price to sellers on the basis of their willingness to pay. The total profit is lower than the profit without price discrimination, when B2B e-intermediary uses neither seller＇ s willingness to pay nor their cost to serve. When heterogeneity in cost to serve between the high and low cost sellers is large, the B2B e-intermediary discriminates and offers different equilibrium prices to sellers. In particular, B2B e-intermediary charges higher price to high cost sellers on the basis of their cost. At this higher price for the high type, some of the first period high sellers with relatively low willingness to pay do not purchase in the second period. B2B e-intermediary charges lower prices to low cost sellers on the basis of their willingness to pay, and all low cost sellers are retained in the second period. The total profit is greater than the profit without price discrimination if the service cost heterogeneity is sufficiently large.