退市制度、公司治理与中小股东利益保护——基于南纺股份的案例

Delisting System,Corporate Governance and Minority Shareholders' Interests Protection——Case Analysis Based on the Nanjing Textile Import & Export Co.,Ltd

退市制度是上市公司发展中不可回避的话题之一,完善的退市制度可以从外部加强对公司的监管,完善公司治理,直接或间接的保护中小股东利益。而国有公司严重的内部人控制问题,导致管理层存在谋取控制权私利而侵占中小股东利益的行为。本文通过对南纺股份的分析发现,新退市制度在一定程度上可以完善公司治理,加强了对中小股东利益的保护,但同时对于公司治理效应存在弱化现象,证券交易所在处理上市公司退市时拥有较小自主权的现状并没有改变。

Delisting system is one of the unavoidable topic in the development of the listed company.Good delisting system can strengthen supervision of the company from external environment,reduce agency costs,improve corporate governance,directly or indirectly protect minority shareholders' interests.However,the serious insider control problem of the state-owned company,which leads to the managers existence behavior of occupatting the interests of small shareholders through seizing the control rights.In this paper,through the analysis of Nanjing textile import and export Limited by Share Ltd,we found that new delisting system in a certain extent can improve corporate governance,strengthened the protection of the interests of small shareholders,but it also can reduce corporate governance effect.The situation that stock exchange have a smaller self sovereignty in handling the delisting of listed companies remains unchanged.