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基于IAD框架的政府付费生态补偿利益关系及协调 被引量:4

Interest Relationship and Coordination in Government-Financed PES Programs Based on Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
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摘要 基于制度分析和发展框架,对政府付费生态补偿利益关系进行系统逻辑整合,分析利益冲突原因并提出协调对策。研究表明,政府付费生态补偿利益关系受到付费者与提供者之间的激励—约束机制、生态—社会系统与行动者之间的投入—产出机制的影响,利益关系具体表现为付费者和提供者地位和行动体现的利益分配关系、信息和支付体现的利益获取关系以及控制和潜在结果体现的利益保障关系,其利益冲突及原因为:一是行动边界的模糊和地位不平等导致利益分配失衡;二是信息不对称和支付不匹配容易造成利益获取不当;三是控制水平过于集中和潜在结果难以度量使得利益保障困难。据此,提出改进规则或合同激励生态服务提供者、促进信息共享提高行动者的信任水平等建议,调节生态补偿利益关系,优化生态补偿机制。 This paper presents a synthesis of logical approach to understanding concerns of government- financed PES programs and to revealing the interest conflict through a distinct perspective using the institution analysis and development( IAD) framework. The study shows that PES has been affected by two mechanisms. One is the incentive and restriction mechanism between the buyers and the providers,and the other is the input and output mechanism between ecosocial systems and actors. Furthermore,the interest relationship between the buyers and the providers can be shown as three aspects,including interest relation of distribution embodied in position and action,interest relation of gain embodied in information and payoff,and interest relation of guarantee embodied in control and outcomes. On this basis,this paper analyzes the interest conflict and its causes in government- financed PES programs as follows: firstly,blurred action boundary and unequal position will lead to unbalanced distribution,for they cannot provide sustainable incentives and long- term effective supervision; secondly,asymmetric information and mismatched payoff will lead to undue interests,for they are likely to cause the fraudulent action taken by the providers using their information advantages; thirdly,centralization of control and difficult- measured outcomes will lead to difficult guarantee,for they make the providers unable protect their own interests. Finally,this paper is to develop an interest coordination between actors in PES programs from incentive contract and shared information to optimize the PES mechanism.
出处 《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第5期137-144,158,共8页 Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"经济发达地区生态补偿的土地利用变化效应及其优化调控研究--以苏州市为例"(71373129)
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