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我国消费信贷博弈模型分析 被引量:5

Analysis of Game Model for Consumer Credit of Our Country
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摘要 消费信贷作为消费信用形式之一 ,是市场经济条件下利用信贷手段促进消费品购销的重要方式。但在我国 ,消费信贷事业尚处起步阶段 ,由于市场机制不完善 ,信用程度不高 ,致使银行和消费者在消费信贷时面临较大的风险。借贷任一方的行为决策都要考虑对方未来行为的各种可能性及后果而作出选择 ,而这种决策又依赖于双方所掌握的信息。为此 ,利用博弈理论 ,根据信息是否对称 ,分析完全且完美信息和完全但不完美信息两种情况的信贷行为。 As one of the consumption credit form, consumer credit is an important method to advance consumable sales by making use of credit under the condition of market economy. However, in our country, consumer credit is just at the early stage. The bank and the consumer usually face considerable risk due to the incomplete market mechanism and the low credit rating. Bothe sides of the debit and credit must take into consideration all possibilities of the other side's future activities and consequences before the decision-making that depends on the information they hold. Therefore, by using theory of game, we will analyse credit activities in two situations: having complete and perfect information and having complete but imperfect information respectively, according to whether the information is symmetrical of not.
作者 李广和 高晶
出处 《决策借鉴》 2002年第3期24-28,共5页
关键词 消费信贷 完全且完美信息 完全但不完美信息 博弈 Consumer credit Complete and perfice information Complete and imperfect information Game
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  • 1谢识予.《经济博弈论》[M].复旦大学出版社,1996年版..
  • 2[加]马丁J·奥斯本,[美]阿里尔·鲁宴斯坦.《博弈论教程》,中国社会科学出版社.

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