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排他性单一品牌经销的汽车售后市场垄断化效应 被引量:5

The Aftermarkets Monopolization Effects of Exclusive Single Brand Distribution in Motor Vehicle Sector
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摘要 中国中高端品牌汽车售后市场垄断化的形成逻辑及其竞争效应,既是检验各种售后市场理论假说的重要案例,也是制定汽车行业反垄断政策和进行反垄断执法的重要基础。本文基于中国中高端品牌汽车经销纵向组织结构及其纵向限制协议关系对售后市场理论加以扩展分析显示,排他性单一品牌授权专营体制的售后市场杠杆化应用是造成汽车高"零整比"的根本原因,具有纵向市场势力的品牌汽车生产商通过纵向价格和非价格限制合约的复合性和累积性应用,将售前市场垄断势力放大性延伸到售后市场,实现了对购车消费者的强锁定和索要高维修保养价格。售后市场垄断化是支配性汽车生产商一种有利可图的策略性滥用行为,严重伤害了配件经销市场和维修服务市场的有效竞争,应该受到反垄断法的禁止。汽车行业反垄断应重点通过反垄断立法和执法来重构品牌汽车经销组织体制,建立竞争性品牌汽车售后市场体系。汽车售后市场反垄断的重点是消除排他性单一品牌授权专营体制售后市场杠杆化应用的行业惯例,禁止各种伤害竞争的纵向限制协议,实现原厂维修配件自由交易和授权维修商与独立维修商的有效竞争,以形成开放性售后配件市场和竞争性维修保养市场。 The logic and competition effects of aftermarket monopolization in Chinese high-end motor vehicle distribution are an important controversial topic of aftermarket theory, and also are the bases of antimonopoly policy and enforcement in automobile industry. Based on special vertical organization and complex vertical restraints in high-end brand cars distribution, this paper extends aftermarket theory model to analyze aftermarket monopolization in China motor vehicle distribution. The results show that the leverage of exclusive single brand distribution to aftermarkets is the main reason of aftermarkets monopolization and supra-competitive prices for spare parts and maintenance service. Under which, dominate automobile companies extend market power to aftennarkets by composite and accumulation of vertical restraints on price and non-price terms, consumers are locked in a single manufacture's brand in aftermarket supplies, they have to pay excessively high maintenance price. Aftermarket monopolization is profitable strategic dominant conducts for automobile companies. It eliminates competition of spare parts market and maintenance service market and harms consumer welfare and social welfare, whereas it should be prohibited by antimonopoly law. The goal of antimonopoly policy is to restructure distribution system patterns of brand cars and build competitive aftermarkets system by enact antimonopoly guidelines and enforcement. It is the key of antimonopoly policy to prohibit normal aftermarkets monopolization by exclusive single brand distribution leverage which carried by dominate automobile companies, the antimonopoly agency should ban antieompetitive vertical constraints, realize the free trade of spare parts and effective competition between authorized maintainers and independent maintainers, so as to protnote competition in spare parts market and maintenance service market.
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第9期41-58,共18页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金重点项目"标准必要专利滥用的竞争效应及反垄断规制政策研究"(批准号16AJY001) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"寡头三级价格歧视竞争效应与反垄断审查机制研究"(批准号14YJA790051) 浙江省自然科学基金项目"公用事业用户差别定价经济效应评价及监管改革研究"(批准号LY16G030011)
关键词 汽车行业 排他性单一品牌经销 售后市场垄断化 纵向限制 反垄断指南 motor vehicle sector exclusive single brand distribution aftermarket monopolization vertical restraints antimonopoly guidelines
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参考文献23

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二级参考文献23

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