违约情形下的信用保单质押融资

The Credit Insurance Policy Ledge Financing in the Case of Default

为了解决制造商以及零售商均存在资金约束的供应链的融资问题,构建了零售商存在违约的情形时的信用保单质押融资模型。基于报童模型的随机规划问题和博弈论的分析方法,分析了不同利率条件下零售商的订货决策、银行的利率决策以及制造商的投保决策。分析表明,零售商控制本身的违约率,通过合理的订货量获取利润。制造商通过合理的投保水平以及批发价决策来实现本身的效益。银行确定合理的利率以及根据制造商的投保水平来确定融资额度,以求实现自身的利润。制造商以及银行都希望零售商有低的违约率。其中,信用保险对融资中的各方都是有利的。

In order to solve the problem of financing of the manufacturer and the retailer, a credit policy pledge financing model is constructed. Based on the newsboy model of stochastic programming problem and game theory, the different interest rates under conditions of retailer＇s ordering decisions, bank interest rate decisions and insurance decisions of the manufacturer are analyzed. The analysis shows that the retailer controls the default rate and obtains the profit by the reasonable order quantity. The manufacturer achieves benefits through reasonable insurance level and wholesale price decision. In order to achieve profits, banks determine a reasonable rate of interest as well as the manufacturer＇s insurance level, to determine the a- mount of financing. Manufacturers and banks want retailers with a low default rate. Credit insurance is beneficial to all parties in financing.