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学者背景独立董事、公司业绩与CEO变更 被引量:21

Academic Independent Directors,Corporate Performance and CEO Change
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摘要 针对证券市场普遍存在的学者背景独立董事,本文利用上市公司(2004—2012年)数据,研究发现董事会中学者背景独立董事比例越高时,公司财务业绩越好,CEO变更——业绩敏感性越高。特别地,当公司经历业绩滑坡后,将聘任更高比例的学者独董。进一步细化分析发现,综合型学者独董在提高业绩、提升CEO变更——业绩敏感性中作用更为明显,业绩滑坡后公司董事会更倾向于聘任综合型、专家型学者独董。总体而言,研究结果证实了学者独董的治理功能。 Based on the prevailing of academic independent directors in securities market, using listed companies (2004 - 2012), this study finds that, the more academic independent director, the better finan- cial performance, and also the higher the sensitivity of CEO change to performance. Particularly, more aca- demic independent directors will be nominated when the companies experienced a performance decline. We also find that comprehensive academic independent directors play greater roles in improving financial perfor- mance and the sensitivity of CEO change to performance. And the comprehensive and specialist academic independent directors are more likely to be nominated by companies which experienced declining perfor- rnanee. As a whole, the study demonstrated the governanee role of academic independent directors.
出处 《财经科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第9期77-87,共11页 Finance & Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71372206) 国家社会科学基金重大项目(项目编号:13&ZD146) 国家社会科学基金项目(项目编号:10CJL038) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(项目编号:NCET-13-0963) 中央高校基本科研业务费项目(项目编号:JBK140501)~~
关键词 独立董事 学者 治理机制 业绩滑坡 Independent Director Scholar Governance Mechanism Performance Decline
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参考文献24

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