国企高管权力强度和资本投资与公司业绩波动

Managerial Power in State-Owned Enterprises,Capital Investment and Fluctuations of Performance

投资活动作为公司最重要的理财活动之一,对公司未来业绩以及业绩的稳定性影响重大,而投资决策不可避免的受到公司高管权力强度的影响。以2004—2013年我国沪深两市国有控股上市公司为研究样本,采用固定效应模型探讨了企业高级管理层的权力强度与企业投资规模之间的相互作用关系,并且深入研究了权力强度如何影响由投资所产生的绩效波动。结果表明,高管权力强度与资本投资正相关,地方政府终极控制的上市公司较之中央控股的公司高级管理层权力强度对于投资更加敏感;投资产生的绩效波动受高级管理层权力的影响被进一步放大,地方政府此种效应比中央政府控股的公司更加显著。

The investmentactivities of company as one of the most important financial activities,for the future performance of the company and the stability of the performance have a vital effect. Taking the state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research sample in 2004- 2013,and using the fixed effect model to discuss the relationship between the managerial power in companies and the investment scale of companies,and to further study how the managerial power affects the fluctuations of performance by the investment. The conclusions are as follow： Managerial power in state-owned enterprises has positive effect on the firms＇ capital investment. Moreover,the correlation between investment and managerial power in local government-owned enterprises is more significant than central government-owned enterprises. Managerial power influences the correlation between fluctuations of performance and investment positively,and the positive influence is found more significantly in local government-owned enterprises.