中国交叉上市公司的投资效率与市场价值——绑定假说还是政府干预假说?

The Investment Efficiency and Market Value of China's Cross-listed Companies:Hypothesis of Bonding or Government Intervention?

本文以中国上市公司2006—2014年的平衡面板数据考察H+A交叉上市公司是因为绑定了香港交易所的更严格的法律与监管制度而具有更高的投资效率与市场价值,还是因为受到更多的政府干预而具有相反的表现。通过数据包络分析法来计算技术效率、规模效率、规模报酬递增并以此度量投资的静态效率,通过Malmquist生产率指数及其次级指数来度量投资的动态效率,结果支持政府干预假说:H+A公司具有更低的静态与动态投资效率以及更低的市场价值。

We investigate whether China＇s H＋A cross-listed companies get higher investment efficiency and greater market value because of their bonding to the more stringent legal and regulatory environment of Hong Kong Exchange,or the opposite performance due to more intervention from government.We apply the approach of data envelopment analysis to calculate static efficiency of investment,and use Malmquist productivity index and its decompositions to measure dynamic efficiency.The results support the hypothesis of government intervention and show that H＋A companies have lower static and dynamic investment efficiency,and lower market value.