政治关系与借款逾期——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

Political Connection and Overdue Loans:Evidence from Chinese Private Listed firms

利用民营上市公司详细披露的长期借款信息来识别民营企业的借款逾期情况,考察政治关系与借款逾期之间的关系。研究发现,具有政治关系的民营企业更容易发生借款逾期,在借款逾期的可能性、逾期金额、逾期时间上都显著高于无政治关系的民营企业;进一步研究发现,政治关系的借款逾期效应在市场化程度低、政府干预较强的地区更加明显。

This study uses the disclosure of long-term borrowings information of private listed firms to identify their overdue loans,and examines the relationship between the political connection and the overdue loan. The study finds that private firms with political connections are likely to have overdue loans. In terms of the possibility,default amount and overdue time,overdue loans of private firms with political connection are all significantly higher than that without. Further study finds that the above effect is stronger in the regions with low marketization and heavy government invention.