摘要
通过双寡头企业的竞争与收益分析得到企业的支付函数,对非水平行业中企业的创新选择进行博弈分析。由博弈均衡分析竞争对企业创新的影响,在Aghion的逐步创新与自动追赶假设下,只有在市场竞争激烈或缺乏竞争的极端条件下,领先者才会不创新;在市场竞争程度适中的条件下,领先者将随机选择是否创新。非水平行业中,企业创新受创新成本、学习效应、产出能力和串谋程度的影响,竞争抑制非水平行业中企业的创新,即存在明显的熊彼特效应。
The double-oligarchs ' competition and profits are analyzed in the unleveled sectors to get the payoff function. Their choices of the innovation are discussed by applying game theory. Then the effects of the competition to the innovation in the unleveled sectors are studied.It is found that under the assumption of gradual innovation and automated pursuit of Aghion,leader only in extreme conditions in the fierce market competition or lack of competition will not choose to innovate. Under the conditions of moderate degree of market competition,leaders will randomly choose whether be innovative or not. In the unleveled sectors of industry,enterprise innovation is influenced by the cost of innovation, learning effect and output capacity or collusion degree. Competition inhibits innovation in unleveled sectors of industry,namely,the existence of obvious Schumpeterian effect.
出处
《阅江学刊》
2016年第4期63-69,147,共7页
Yuejiang Academic Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"中国传统制造产业集群转型与转移融合发展模式与实现路径研究"(71503143)
关键词
非水平行业
企业创新
市场竞争
创新成本
熊彼特效应
unleveled sectors
enterprise innovation
market competition
innovation cost
Schumpeterian effect