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社会科学的自然主义进路何以可能——兼论塞尔的解决方案 被引量:1

Feasibility Research on the Naturalist Approach of Social Science——Also on the Solution of Searle
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摘要 将自然科学的方法范式引入社会科学的自然主义进路,由于坚持了自然科学的公共性、可重复性和价值中立原则,保证了社会科学可以以一门科学的形式发展,因而成了当今社会科学哲学的主流,这一进路的合法性也得到了越来越多的实践证明和学者的认可。但与此同时,以诠释学和实用主义为代表的非自然主义进路则认为社会科学和自然科学之间存在着本体论层面的张力,社会科学的复杂性和独特性使其难以采取自然科学的方法范式,据此自然主义进路发出挑战。塞尔在吸收这些批判的基础上,坚持自然主义原则,从集体意向性出发,建构了一种旨在中和社会科学的独特性和自然主义方法论之间的矛盾的社会实在论。塞尔的这一思路可以作为自然主义社会科学哲学的一种出路。 To keep to the publicity, the repeatability and the value neutrality principle of natural science ensure that social science can develop like natural science. It has become the mainstream research subject of today' s philoso- phy of social science and natural science paradigm has been introduced into the study of social science. The legiti- macy of this naturalistic approach is demonstrated by more and more practical proof and recognized by more and more scholars. However, the non-naturalistic approach, represented by hermeneutics and pragmatism, holds that there is an ontological tension between social science and natural science. The complexity and uniqueness of social science make it difficult for us to take the paradigm of natural science in social science studies, leading the non- naturalistic approach to challenge the naturalistic approach. Drawing on the critique, adhering to the principle of naturalism and starting from the collective intentionality Searle constructed a social realism, which is aimed at neu- tralizing the contradiction between the uniqueness of social science and naturalistic methodology. This thought of Searle could be regarded as a way out for the naturalistic philosophy of social science.
作者 王晓森 殷杰
出处 《科学技术哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第5期56-61,共6页 Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金 教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(15JJD720010) 国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AZX004) 山西省三晋学者支持计划
关键词 自然主义 社会科学哲学 集体意向性 naturalism philosophy of social science collective intentionality
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