政府干预与地价扭曲——基于全国微观地块数据的分析被引量：18

Government Intervention and Land Price Distortion:Based on a National- wide Parcel- level Dataset

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摘要本文基于土地挂牌出让与拍卖出让的价格差异分析政府干预导致的地价扭曲,对广为接受的"土地出让收入最大化"逻辑做出补充。利用全国208个地级市1998-2013年的微观地块数据,在处理选择偏误并控制地块特征后,发现作为地方政府干预工具的挂牌价格显著低于市场化程度更高的拍卖价格,且价格差异程度对于不同用途地块有所不同。本文进一步从发展地区经济、房价调控、腐败等角度检验了地方政府扭曲地价的原因。 By investigating the price differences for Guapai and Paimai, this paper illustrates the land price distortion caused by government intervention and provides a new understanding of the well-recognized land revenue maximization hypoth- esis. Using a parcel-level dataset of 208 cities during 1998-2013, controlling the parcel characteristics and correcting for the potential selection bias, we find that land prices for Guapai, which mainly act as tool of government manipulation, are signifi- cantly lower the prices for the market-oriented Paimai. This price differences vary for parcels of different land use patterns. We further explore the reasons for the price distortion, from the prospect of local economic development, real estate regulation and corruption.

作者王媛

机构地区华东师范大学经济与管理学部经济学院

出处《中国经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第5期29-41,共13页 China Economic Studies

基金国家自然科学基金青年项目(71303060) 上海市教育委员会上海市教育发展基金会"晨光计划"项目(14CG26)的资助

关键词土地出让收入政府干预挂牌拍卖 land revenue government intervention Guapai Paimai

分类号 D630 [政治法律—中外政治制度] F301.4 [经济管理—产业经济]

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