管理层持股如何影响关联交易?

Corporate Governance and Related Party Transaction

现有研究普遍认为关联交易是第一大股东对于公司的掏空行为。本文将研究对象拓展到董事会和高管团队,基于利益趋同和壕沟防御理论,提出了管理层持股与关联交易数额影响关系的假设,并利用2008-2013年中国上市公司面板数据对相关假设进行了实证分析。研究结果显示高管团队持股与关联交易数额呈线性负相关关系,董事会持股与关联交易数额则呈L型曲线关系,且负向影响随着公司风险的增加而增强。这表明管理层持股能够有条件地抑制关联交易,公司风险则会增强这种抑制行为。

Related party transaction is commonly viewed as a mean of tunneling taken by the majority shareholder. This study takes both the alignment effect and entrenchment effect into consideration based on the data from the listed corporations in China during from 2008 to 2013. The result shows that the related party transaction and board holdings present a L-shaped curve relationship while TMT holdings present a linear relationship which is more significant when the risk increases. It indi- cates that the board and TMT holdings conditionally restrain related party transaction, while risk increases the effect. This arti- cle further suggests that the related party transaction disclose system on listed corporations should be perfected. Moreover, when considering the inner regulation from board and TMT, their selves tunneling behaviors should be paid attention to. At last, a risk control system is desirable in effective corporate governance.