CEO权力、投资决策与民营企业价值

CEO Power, Investment Decisions and Private Enterprise Value

将CEO权力区分为资源依赖理论的声望权力与专家知识权力,以及代理问题理论的结构权力与所有权权力,探讨CEO权力对投资决策和民营企业价值的影响。研究发现,当投资机会较好时支持资源依赖理论,认为民营企业会依赖CEO的能力进行决策,使企业价值提升;当投资机会不好时,CEO倾向于做出有利自身而不利于民营企业的决策,造成边际投资价值递减,从而损害企业价值。民营企业投资不足时,CEO权力与资本支出呈显著负相关关系;民营企业投资过度时,CEO权力与资本支出不存在显著相关关系。民营企业进行资本支出总体上有利于企业价值提升。

In this paper, CEO power is divided into popularity power and expert knowledge power of the resource dependence theory, the structure power and ownership power of agency theory, to explore CEO power＇s influence on investment decisions and private enterprises. The empirical results show that when the investment opportunity is better, private enterprises will rely on CEO＇s ability to make decision which support resource dependence theory, and the enterprise value will be improved; when the investment opportunity is bad, CEO tends to make decision which is good to himself but unfavorable to the enterprise, and marginal investment value will be diminished, thus damages the value of the enterprise. When the enterprise is lack of investment, the CEO power and capital expenditure has significant negative relationship; CEO power and capital expenditure has no significant relationship under the condition of excessive investment. Private enterprise＇s capital spending in general is helpful to improving enterprise value.