考虑终止权的两阶段研发投资激励和合同设计

Contract Design and Investment Incentive in Two-stage R&D Process with Termination Right

针对产品研发过程中的投资激励问题,分别建立了存在终止权和不存在终止权两种情况下的两阶段研发投资决策模型,并利用逆向归纳法讨论了委托方的偿付合同设计。研究结果表明:当第一阶段的研发结果为高质量时,代理人在第二阶段的投资积极性更高,代理人在第一阶段的投资水平和委托方支付的最优偿付都随着低质量时研发成功的比例系数而单调递减;研发活动的终止威胁导致代理人的投资积极性降低;在一定范围内,或有终止权偿付合同能够缓解信息不对称时的投资不足问题、提高双方的研发合作效率。

For the investment incentive problem in R -D process, this paper gives a two stage sequential investment model to analyze the partic- ipants＇ investment decision at the contracting stage based on the existence of termination rights. The result shows as follows：the agent is moti vated to invest when the quality of R＆D results in first stage is high;both the optimal payment of the principal and the investment level of the agent in first stage decrease as the probability of innovation＇s success increases when the quality of R＆D results in first stage is low; in the inter- val based on the threshold of declining level, the threat of the termination of R＆D results in the decrease of agent＇s investment incentive;to some extent,the contingent termination right payment contract could mitigate the hold-up problem to improve the efficiency of R＆D cooperation.