证券市场环境、政治关系与保荐人信用监管的选择性执行

Securities Market Environment, Political Relations and the Selective Execution of Credit Supervision on Sponsor

以2004-2014年受到证监会信用监管的保荐人为研究样本,从"信用监管"角度研究监管机构对保荐人违规惩罚力度的选择性执行行为。研究发现:(1)在证券市场低迷时,证监会唯恐打击市场信心而较少地重罚违规保荐人,但在证券市场比较活跃时为了提高证券发行的质量,证监会会选择加大惩戒力度;(2)有政治关系的保荐人相比没有政治关系的保荐人受到的处罚更轻且逃避处罚的时间更长。进一步研究发现,违规保荐人所在的保荐机构的未来市场份额与其处罚程度呈负相关关系,即所受处罚越重,其未来市场份额越小。

This paper takes the securities companies that subject to credit supervision by CSRC as sample, conducts an empirical study on illegal punishment degree from the perspective of ＂credit supervision＂ of the regulatory agency. We found： （1）in the stock mar- ket downturn, CSRC less heavily fines the illegal sponsors in the fear of hitting market confidence. But, when the stock market is more active, CSRC more heavily fines the illegal sponsors so as to improve the quality of the securities issue; （2） Sponsors that have political relations receive a lighter punishment and longer time to escape punishment, we further found the market share of the sponsors is nega- tively correlated with the degree of punishment. As is that, the more severe punishment, the smaller its future market share.