地方政府支出有偏性、企业融资约束与经济结构失衡

The Bias of Local Government Expenditures,Corporate Financing Constraints and the Imbalance in Economic Structure

文章基于地方政府视角下困扰当前中国经济增长的结构性现实问题,根据1993—2012年的中国省际年度数据,借鉴Bernanke等(1999)和Fernández-Villaverde(2010)的分析思路,运用动态随机一般均衡模型,实证研究了经济结构失衡1与由地方政府支出有偏性引起的政府投资增加之间的内在逻辑关系。研究发现:(1)伴随着经济增长,东、中、西部的社会投资占GDP的比重不断地提高,而居民消费和劳动收入占GDP的比重则呈下降趋势,这些经济结构失衡的表现与由地方政府支出有偏性引起的政府投资增加是共存的。(2)通过对大企业模型、中小企业模型和粘性价格模型进行的模拟比较分析发现,地方政府发展经济的目的促使其支出行为表现为有偏性,引发了政府投资较大幅度的增加;基于融资约束,中小企业的投资增幅不大,而大企业投资高涨,引致了地方经济结构失衡的加剧,而在这传导机制中政府投资的正外部性、企业融资约束和金融摩擦担当重要角色。

Based on the structure reality problems exercising current economic growth in China from a perspective of local governments, this paper uses the provincial annual data from 1993 to 2012, draws lessons from Bernanke et al. （1999） and Ferndndez-Villaverde （2010） and constructs a DSGE model to make an empirical study of the internal logic relationship between the imbalance in economic structure and the increase in government investment resulting from the bias of local government expenditures. It comes to the results as follows, firstly, along with economic growth, the proportions of social investment in East China, Central China and West China constantly rise, but the proportions of house- hold consumption and labor income show the downward trends; and the performance of the imbalance in economic structure coexists with the increase in government investment resulting from the bias of local government expenditures; secondly, a simulation comparison between big enterprise model, small and medium sized enterprise model, and sticky price model shows that the aim of economic development advanced by local governments promotes the bias of local government expenditures, leading to the increase in government investment by a big margin~ owing to financing constraints, the investment of small and medium sized enterprises experiences no great increase, but the investment of large enter- prises experiences a big rise, thereby intensifying the imbalance in local economic struc- ture; and in this transmission mechanism, positive externalities of government investment, corporate financing constraints and financial friction play the important role.