摘要
一国如何在国内层面实施国际金融软法一直是一个理论和实践难题。为缓和乃至消除场外衍生品市场中的交易对手违约风险,二十国集团(G20)峰会主张引入中央对手清算机制,并通过"新国际金融架构"在全球推行。面对国际方案,中国采取了相对温和的"域内适用"实施模式,而美国则采取了更具攻击性的"域外适用"实施模式。然而,两种实施模式均存在导致监管制度趋于僵化的可能性。不仅如此,这两种实施模式具有将金融风险向中央对手聚集的效应,如果监管不当,很可能引发新一轮的金融危机。考虑到当前新国际金融架构下的监管国际化、标准化和形式趋同,远非构建全球金融治理的理想方式,为防止监管僵化引发新一轮金融危机,各国监管者在实施国际方案时,应引入"替代合规"机制,为金融监管制度的演进留下足够的发展空间。
How to implement soft law in international finance has been always a theoretical and practice puzzle. G20 summits introduce the central counterparty clearing mechanism to mollify and even eliminate the counterparties' default risks in over-the-counter derivatives markets and push it all over the world through the New International Finance Architecture(NIFA). With respect to such international plan,China takes relatively moderate territorial application strategy, while U.S. takes more intrusive exterritorial application strategy. However,both of these two implementation modes lead to the possibility of regulatory ossification. Besides,these two implementation modes have the effects of converging financial risks to central counterparties, and it could ignite another round of financial crises if there is improper supervision.Considering that the internationalization and standardization of regulation and form convergence under the current NIFA are far from the ideal way to the establishment of global finance governance, the regulatory authorities should introduce the substantive compliance mechanism during their implementation of the international plan and create adequate development space for the evolution of financial supervision system to prevent another round of financial crises resulting from regulatory ossification.
出处
《上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期104-115,共12页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
关键词
场外衍生品
中央对手
监管僵化
替代合规
over-the-counter derivative
central counterparty
regulatory ossification
substantive compliance