行为理由:事实与规范的连结

Reasons for Action:Concatenation of Facts and Norms

"休谟法则"的提出逻辑上切断了由事实直接推导规范性的可能。然而,此后的法哲学家们并没有放弃通道的发现与建构,经由安斯库姆、塞尔、拉兹、麦考密克和魏因贝格尔到亚瑟·海格等这一脉,以原初事实为基础论说制度事实的规范性形成。与法律实证主义的承认规则不同,它为行为理由连结事实与规范提供理论分析基础,又契合了司法裁判工作的任务——以事实与规范为质料的生产,完成个案裁判在规范问题上的正当化。

The advent of David Hume＇s description between facts and norms logically cuts off the possibility of directly deducing normativity from facts. However, legal philosophers have been finding and constructing the channels between them ever since. From G. E. M. Anscombe, John R. Searle, Joseph Raz, Nell MacCormick and Ota Weinberger to Jaap C. Hage, who discuss the form of normativity of institutional facts based on brute thereof. Unlike the rule of cognition of legal positivism, it provides basis of theoretical analysis for reasons for actions concatenating facts and norms. Besides, it conforms to the tasks of judicial adjudication, which makes judgment based on facts and norms, accomplishing justification of the problems of normativity in a case judgment.